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SUMMARY Computer networks are facing serious threats from the
emergence of sophisticated new DGA bots. These DGA bots have their
own dictionary, from which they concatenate words to dynamically gen-
erate domain names that are difficult to distinguish from human-generated
domain names. In this letter, we propose an approach for identifying the
callback communications of DGA bots based on relations among the words
that constitute the character string of each domain name. Our evaluation in-
dicates high performance, with a recall of 0.9977 and a precision of 0.9869.
key words: dga bot, dictionary-based domain generation algorithm, do-
main name, network security
1. Introduction
Some of the most serious security threats facing computer
networks involve botnets. A botnet is a group of compro-
mised machines, termed bots, that can be remotely con-
trolled through a command-and-control server (C&C). Cy-
bercriminals operate these bots through a C&C to per-
form malicious activities, such as phishing an organization,
spreading bots to other machines, and stealing confidential
information.
Although administrators need to swiftly remove bots
that reside in their networks, many botnets have domain gen-
eration algorithms (DGAs) to avoid detection [1]. A DGA is
a mechanism that frequently changes the domain name for
the C&C to hide the callback communication from the bot
to the C&C. Specifically, the bot uses the DGA to dynami-
cally generate domain names and attempts name resolution
for each; the domain name that returns the correct response
is taken to be the C&C.
Some previous studies [2]–[4] focused on discernible
differences in the character strings of benign and malicious
domain names for detecting the callbacks of DGA bots. For
example, Truong et al. [3] proposed a method that learns
and predicts the character patterns in domain names using
bigram models with supervised learning. Anderson et al. [4]
extended this method to include character-level modeling
with long short-term memory (LSTM) networks. These
methods are based on observations: benign domain names
tend to reflect the intent of their domain registrants, such as
an organization, product, or content; in contrast, malicious
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domain names are meaningless character strings because
conflicts with already registered domain names must be
avoided. These efforts have spurred the emergence of more
sophisticated DGA bots to defeat these detection methods.
These DGA bots have their own dictionary, from which
they can concatenate words to dynamically generate domain
names that are difficult to distinguish from human-generated
domain names [5]. Thus, character-level modeling, which
excludes words, is unlikely to ensure sufficient accuracy for
detecting these dictionary-based DGA (dict-DGA) bots.
Pereira et al. [6] proposed a method for detecting dict-
DGA bots based solely on domain strings. This method
has two functions: estimating the dictionary used by dict-
DGA bots from their callbacks and identifying malicious
domain names using the estimated dictionary. However, this
identification is extremely simple: malicious domain names
are determined by whether the number of words constitut-
ing the character string exceeds a given threshold level in
the estimated dictionary. As a result, many false positives
are caused by the lack of consideration of benign domain
names. Our work focuses on characterizing the differences
between benign and malicious domain names by machine
learning, and the results improve upon those achieve by the
method in [6].
2. Proposal
In this letter, we attempt to detect dict-DGA bots by identi-
fying malicious domain names from massive queries for do-
main name systems (DNSs). We focus on queried domain
names for the DNSs because name resolution is an unen-
crypted interaction that always occurs prior to the callbacks
of DGA bots. Table 1 shows examples of domain names
generated by dict-DGA bots. Since there are differences
between dynamically generated domain names and human-
generated domain names in terms of the frequency of word
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Fig. 1 Overview of the proposed approach for detecting dict-DGA bots
based on word relations in domain names.
co-occurrences, we propose an approach for identifying ma-
licious domain names by analyzing relations among the
words constituting character strings in each domain name.
The novelties of this approach include the following: (1) the
use of general graph-theoretical techniques to represent re-
lations among words in domain names; and (2) the use of
centrality to quantify the importance of each word in the
domain name. These indicators characterize the differences
between benign and malicious domain names. Finally, we
apply machine learning to the feature vectors derived from
these indicators to reduce the number of false positives.
In [7], the domains for classification as benign or ma-
licious were significantly narrowed by focusing on nonex-
istent domain (NXDOMAIN) responses that occur as the
DGA changes the callback destination. In this case, the
NXDOMAIN response is an error message that indicates an
invalid domain name. Based on this insight, we consider
only domains for which the name resolution yielded NX-
DOMAIN responses.
Figure 1 shows an overview of the proposed approach,
which has three steps: (1) word segmentation, (2) word
graph construction, and (3) feature-vector-based identifica-
tion. The following sections describe the training datasets
and each of these steps in detail.
2.1 Training Datasets
We denote a dataset comprising the same type of domains
by x ∈ Xi, i ∈ 0 · · · n, where the dataset X0 contains
benign domains and the remaining n datasets X1, · · · , Xn
contain malicious domains generated by n different DGA
bots. Note that domain names in the datasets are short-
ened and replaced with primary domain names. A pri-
mary domain is the highest-level domain name given to
a registrar. For example, the primary domain names
for www.ieice.org and ns.kyutech.ac.jp would be
Fig. 2 Example of constructing a word graph using a set of word groups.
ieice.org and kyutech.ac.jp, respectively.
2.2 Word Segmentation
This step segments the primary-level character string for do-
main x into a word group w using a dictionary D. Dictio-
naryD includes an English dictionary and a corpus collected
through web crawling. Word segmentation is based on two
conditions: (1) minimize the number of words while maxi-
mizing the length of words, and (2) give preference to words
that are in the dictionary by increasing their likelihood of
being selected. We define this word segmentation approach
with the following equation:







1 (w j ∈ D)1/|D||w j | (w j < D)
Here, W(x) is all the candidate segmentations for the
primary-level character string of domain x; w is the can-
didate segmentation comprising words w1, · · · , w j, · · · , wn;
|w j| is the length of word w j; and |D| is the total number of
words in dictionary D. Furthermore, P(w j) is the selectivity
of word w j, which is based on whether word w j is in dictio-
nary D. P(w j) = 1 when w j ∈ D, and P(w j) = 1/|D||w j | when
w j < D. As an example of word segmentation, a primary-
level character string kyutechlocaldomain is divided into
word group {kyutech, local, domain}. When this step of
the algorithm is complete, it outputs a set of word groups Wi
derived by segmenting the primary-level character strings
for all the domains in training dataset Xi. Note that set Wi
allows us to contain duplicate elements.
2.3 Word Graph Construction
This step uses a word graph to represent the relations among
a set of word groups Wi corresponding to domain strings in
training dataset Xi. A word graph Gi is simply a weighted
undirected graph with a vertex set and an edge set. Each
vertex corresponds to each word in set Wi; the edge weights
indicate the frequencies of co-occurrence of words in set Wi,
where co-occurrence means that the words belong to the
same word group. Note that words with similar character
strings share the same vertex. We use the Levenshtein ratio
for similarity calculations and unweighted centroid cluster-
ing with threshold thα for word aggregation. Figure 2 shows
an example of a constructed word graph using the set of
three-word groups [ {kyutech, local, domain}, {kyutech,
LETTER
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Table 2 Numbers of benign and malicious domains in the datasets.
D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7
Benign Banjori Gozi Matsnu Pizd Rovnix Sisron Suppobox
3021124 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000
local, net}, {ieee, domains } ]. Due to the similarity of
domain and domains, the two words share a vertex. Ad-
ditionally, we define conjunction as a process for two-word
graphs. Conjunction is the process of reconstructing word
graph Gi: j from word group sets Wi and W j into word graphs
Gi and G j.
Dynamically generated malicious domain names and
human-generated benign domain names exhibit clear dif-
ferences in their frequencies of word co-occurrences. The
words that illuminate these distinctions most effectively are
those that play central roles in a word graph. To this end, we
associate the following importance value with an arbitrary





(C0:i(w j) − C0(w j) )
Here, |w j| denotes the length of word w j. C0(w j) and C0:i(w j)
are functions that derive the centrality of word w j in word
graphs G0 and G0:i. Accordingly, this value means that the
change in the centrality of word group w resulting from
the conjunction of word graph G0 is constructed from be-
nign dataset X0 and Gi is constructed from malicious dataset
Xi. To compute the values, we use the PageRank centrality,
which can be used even if a word graph is undirected and
disconnected.
2.4 Feature-Vector-Based Identification
This step first calculates feature vectors from the domains
in the training datasets. Based on the importance values in
the word graph defined in the previous section, the feature
vector for the domain name consisting of word group w is
given by the following equation:
w⃗ =
(S1(w), · · · Si(w), · · · Sn(w))
Then, we apply machine learning to these feature vectors to
construct a training model. We adopt a support vector ma-
chine (SVM) as the machine learning algorithm because of
its generalization and identification performance. The out-
put of this step is the overall identification results of our
algorithm regarding the benign versus malicious nature of
the unknown input domain names, which are obtained by
segmenting the domain name, calculating the feature vector,
and applying the training model.
3. Evaluation
This section presents the experiments conducted to evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The main fo-
cus of the evaluation is the accuracy of identifying benign
and malicious domain names. The experimental setup and
results are described in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2.
Table 3 Experimental results.
Recall Precision
Anderson et al. [4] 0.9977 0.9305
Pereira et al. [6] 0.8873 0.6380
Our work 0.9977 0.9869
3.1 Experimental Setup
Table 2 shows the datasets of the benign and malicious do-
mains used in the experiments. The malicious domains
of seven DGAs were published on the websites [8], [9],
whereas the benign domains resulting in NXDOMAIN re-
sponses were collected via our campus network. We con-
firmed the absence of bot-related domains in the benign set
as follows: suspicious machines were detected by multiple
security appliances, and these machines were examined for
matches with the characteristic reported in [1], [5], [7] that a
DGA bot causes massive NXDOMAIN responses as a result
of name resolution for unfamiliar domains during a short
period. In the experiments, 5-fold cross-validation of the
benign and malicious domains was performed using 20%
of the data as the testing datasets and the remainder as the
training datasets.
For comparison with our approach, we implemented
two different methods for identifying benign and malicious
domains based only on their character strings, as described
in [4] and [6]. The first implementation uses character-
level modeling with LSTM networks applied to the do-
main strings, whereas the second implementation uses the
number of words that constitute the domain string and that
are present in the estimated dictionary as the identification
threshold.
In the proposed approach, we mainly used words reg-
istered in Aspell [10] and the corpus [11] as the dictionary
for word segmentation. The total number of words in the
dictionary was 500,000. We set the threshold thα to 0.85
and the SVM kernel to a radial basis function with hyperpa-
rameter 1.0 and cost 5.0. These parameters were determined
experimentally, and their optimization will be addressed in
a future work.
3.2 Experimental Results and Discussion
We employ two common metrics to characterize the iden-
tification ability for benign and malicious domains. Recall
is the ratio of the number of correctly predicted malicious
domains to the total number of actual malicious domains,
and precision is the ratio of the number of correctly pre-
dicted malicious domains to the total number of predicted
malicious domains.
The experimental results are presented in Table 3,
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Table 4 Numbers of misidentified domains in the datasets.
D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7
Anderson et al. [4] 15631 0 154 0 62 27 0 220
Pereira et al. [6] 105706 0 285 26 23286 28 0 36
Our work 2772 0 295 31 29 32 0 82
where each value is the mean of the 5-fold cross-validation
results. The proposed approach achieves a recall of 0.9977
and a precision of 0.9869. These results indicate that our ap-
proach provides higher accuracy than that of the two previ-
ous implementations considering both recall and precision.
Possible explanations for the performance deterioration in
the two implementations include the following. First, iden-
tifying benign and malicious domains based on only char-
acter patterns has natural limitations. In the implementation
based on [4], the tendency to identify domain names consist-
ing of 8 or more letters alone as malicious was particularly
prominent, and the results caused more than 15,000 false
positives for benign domains. Next, in the implementation
based on [6], uniformly quantifying the importance of words
in the domain strings resulted in a large number of misiden-
tified domains. Specifically, the cases of benign and Pizd
domains were significant, exceeding 100,000 and 23,000
respectively. Although the misidentification for Pizd may
be improved by optimizing the threshold level, false posi-
tives for benign domains will also increase. We attribute the
success of the proposed approach to navigate these pitfalls
to the consideration of differences between words constitut-
ing benign and malicious domain names and to the focus on
words playing central roles in word graphs.
The numbers of misidentified domains are presented
in Table 4, where each value is the sum of the 5-fold cross-
validation results. Our approach achieves a extremely strong
identification performance for Banjori and Sisron, whereas
the other datasets, including the benign domain names, have
some misidentifications. Most of these misidentified do-
main names can be classified into 4 categories: (a) do-
main names consisting of a single word; (b) domain names
consisting of words that appear with extremely low fre-
quency in the training datasets; (c) domain names contain-
ing some words common to benign and malicious domains;
and (d) domain names comprising words not included in
the dictionary. The proposed approach focuses on the re-
lations among words in domain names and leverages the
supervised machine learning to identify benign and mali-
cious domains. The properties of this approach naturally
make accurate identification difficult in cases (a) and (b).
An investigation into the character strings arising in case
(c) revealed many occurrences of words such as domain,
network, host, and local, which are common to both be-
nign and malicious domains. It may be possible to improve
the performance in this area by excluding words that com-
monly appear in domain names, following the technique of
stop words in natural language processing. The poor per-
formance in case (d) arose from domain names being seg-
mented into meaningless short character strings. Examples
include domain names comprising random character strings,
nonalphabetical strings represented alphabetically, or proper
nouns. Thus, the use of more comprehensive dictionaries
will alleviate the issue observed in case (d).
Despite the above problems, we can confirm that the
proposed approach achieves high performance, with a recall
of 0.9977 and a precision of 0.9869. The results suggest
that dict-DGA bots can be removed from a network by using
name resolution for malicious domains as triggers.
4. Conclusions
In this letter, we aimed to detect dict-DGA bots by identi-
fying malicious domain names from massive DNS queries.
Our experiments demonstrated that the proposed approach
is capable of detecting callbacks from DGA bots with high
accuracy. By enabling the ability to swiftly address vari-
ous bots in networks, the approach contributes to dramati-
cally improving network security. In the future, we plan to
evaluate the identification accuracy and computational time
of the approach for DNS queries observed over large-scale
networks.
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